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Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 8/31/12
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,   
  51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$114.00
161.95
131.78
183.22
82.06
97.02
184.87
406.99
$118.44
156.00
147.83
177.89
88.32
92.76
102.00
321.26
$122.38
159.88
143.60
191.05
73.47
82.73
94.00
315.09
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
 Nebraska City, bu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
 Nebraska City, bu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.67
7.48
14.11
12.39
3.84
8.11
8.08
16.79
13.39
3.96
8.10
8.04
17.37
13.21
4.07
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
185.00
117.50
85.00
209.00
110.25
242.50
220.00
155.00
302.50
115.00
242.50
220.00
160.00
322.50
119.00
*No Market
There is a great deal of discussion on the effectiveness
of public policies relating to intervention of government into
the affairs of people. Some believe in “the invisible hand of
the market,” while others call for active involvement of the
government. Yet both sides tend to agree that in the case
where markets fail to deal with too much pollution,
government needs to ensure that those who produce water
pollution either reduce the levels or compensate society
(perhaps through a fine) for the losses. This assumes that
people are only self-interested and will not achieve a shared
optimal outcome with downstream water users without
monetary incentives. 
A downstream water pollution problem arises when
upstream farmers are implementing practices that lead to soil
erosion and chemical/fertilizer runoff, which can be solved
using costly conservation technologies. A traditional
economics approach which sees only self-interest would lead
to proposing a fine (or otherwise increase the costs with
regulations) on farmers for the pollution. Such policy may,
however, be even more costly, as it would also require (again
assuming self-interest only) significant costs for enforcement.
A behavioral economics approach looks beyond fines and
raising costs, to consider non-pecuniary incentives, i.e., try
to nudge the farmer through signals sent from those affected
by the pollution. Dual-interest theory (and the
metaeconomics approach),  suggests that empathy, and as a1
result  joining in sympathy with others for improved water
quality, plays an important role in tempering the tendency to
pollute. An experiment was conducted in July 2012 in the
Experimental and Behavioral Economics Laboratory at the
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, where we compared the
effectiveness of non-pecuniary nudges (sending a “frowney”
face to the upstream farmer) vs. fines. 
 1 http://agecon.unl.edu/web/agecon/metaeconomics
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In total, 432 individuals participated in the experiment
over an eight-day period. The sample included both
university students and other members of the community.
About one-half were females, with the average age being 29
years (ranging between 19 and 85 years). The experimental
sessions took 60-90 minutes, during which the participants
earned $45.16 on average, with more being earned by those
who expressed mainly a tendency to self-interest.
The results discussed in this article are based on three
out of six treatments. Prior to the experiment all participants
participated in an activity. Their performance determined
the role that they would play,
with the top 50 percent
earning the role of an
upstream farmer and the rest
taking the role of a
downstream water user.
During the experiment the
upstream farmer chooses a
leve l  o f  co n se rva tion
technology on 500 acres of
land. The more land put
under conservation, the
lower the profit will be and
the higher the water quality,
and thus the higher the
monetary gains accruing to
the downstream water user.
To compensate for a loss in
profit, the upstream farmer
can require a transfer from
the downstream water user.
The players achieve a shared
optimum if the upstream
farmer places 300 acres under
conservation, (the highest
total profit of 2400 tokens, or
4800 tokens over two rounds;
actual money is earned at the
rate of 75 tokens = $1). Equal
payoffs can be achieved if the
upstream farmer transfers 300
tokens from the downstream
water user. Depending on the
treatment, the downstream
water user can react to the
decision through sending a
“ f r o w n e y ”  ( i n d u c i n g
empathy), or imposing a fine
(monetary decrease in payoff,
a cost). 
We found that under both approaches, participants
chose levels of conservation technology close to the shared
optimal level (Figure 1), suggesting this is about more than
self-interest only for each individual. Interestingly, when
they did not face the “threat” of feedback (frowney or fine),
they were choosing above optimal, shared levels.
Furthermore, we found that inducing empathy works better
for achieving more equal distributions than imposing a fine.
Upstream farmers responded to a frowney face(s) by
allocating more payoff to the downstream water users,
whereas a fine led frequently to retaliation and less sharing
(Figure 2). 
This is good news for public policy, suggesting a less
costly and more effective solution to the pollution problem.
Providing the downstream water user with an opportunity to
signal their emotions, which induces empathy-sympathy,
yields more efficient and
more equal sharing of
profits than the more costly
use of fines. 
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Figure 2. Change in the share of the upstream farmer’s payoff in response
to various feedbacks.
Figure 1. Choice of conservation technology by the upstream farmer in
the first round. 
